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RECENT DECISIONS
BANKING-RELATIONSI-iIP ARISING OUT O" DEPOSIT TO PAY BONDHOLDERS.-De-
fendant, a private banker, distributed bonds for the Mexican Government and
agreed to service them semi-annually, out of funds supplied by Mexico. In 1913,
a sum, too small to meet coupon payments was advanced by Mexico which deposit
defendant banker has continued to hold. Since that time, nothing has been ad-
vanced by Mexico. Plaintiff, assignee of the Mexican Government's claim against
the fund, sues the defendant banker. A bondholder had previously sued the banker
to have the fund turned over to the bondholders. On submission of controversy
on an agreed statement of facts, held, the plaintiff assignee of the Mexican Govern-
ment, is entitled to the fund, since0 the deposit of money in a bank, for the payment
of maturing interest coupons creates the relationship of "creditor and debtor,"
between the depositor and bank, and does not give rise to a trust in favor of the
bondholders. Nacional Financiera, S. A. v. Speyer et al., 26 N. Y. S. (2d) 865 (1941).
Courts are often presented with the problem of determining whether a deposit
made with a bank is (1) a general deposit, (2) a general deposit for a specific
purpose or (3) a special deposit.'. This inquiry arises very often, in cases where
banks have become insolvent.2 Many a depositor has, then, claimed that his
deposit was special. If it was special, the law is that the funds are held not as
part of the bank's assets and not subject to distribution to pay general claims.
The depositor is no longer in the class of general creditors of the bank and he
is entitled to a preference on insolvency.3 If the deposit is held to be a general
deposit or a general deposit for a special purpose, the depositor is a mere general
creditor of the bank. In the present case, substantially the same question is raised
in a different way.
In determining into which class a deposit falls, courts have indicated that the
intention of the parties, the depositor and the bank, is to be determinative. 4 Where
the parties intended that the money deposited was to become the bank's property
and was to be used by the bank in its own business for its own profit, the deposit
may be general or a general deposit for a specific purpose.5 Where the intention
of the parties is that the bank shall not be permitted to use the monies in its own
business for its own profit, the deposit is held by the bank as a special deposit.0
The funds are not an asset of the bank.
1. 3 ScoTT, TRuSTS (3rd ed. 1939) § 530.
2. 1 PATON, DIGEST op LEGAL OPINIONS (1940) ch. Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Op:
§ 7 D 3.
3. First National Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 48 F. (2d) 585 (C. C. A.
9th, 1931); Davis v. McNair, 48 F. (2d) 494 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Bell National Bank
of Pineville v. Green, 258 Ky. 317, 79 S. W. (2d) 967 (1935); Bartholf v. Millett, 22 F.
(2d) 538 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
4. Minard v. Watts, 186 Fed. 245 (C. C. D. Kan., 1910); Fallgatter v. Citizens' National
Bank, 11 F. (2d) 383 (D. C. D. Minn. 1926); Northern Sugar Corp. v. Thompson,
13 F. (2d) 829 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); McKee v. Lamon, 159 U. S. 317 (1895); Titlow
v. Sundquist, 234 Fed. 613 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916)
5. Corporation Commission of North Carolina v. Merchants' Bank and Trust Co., 193
N. C. 696, 138 S. E. 22 (1927); 1 PATON, DIGEST or LEGAL OPINONs (1940) ch. Bank-
ruptcy and Insolvency, Op: § 7 D 3.
6. In Corporation Commission of North Carolina v. Merchants' Bank & Trust Co.,
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Determining this intention is a difficult question where the depositor has indicated
to the bank that he wishes the bank to assist him in accomplishing some special
purpose of his own.7 Thus a business man may deposit a large amount of money
to meet his weekly payroll and ask the bank to make particular arrangements to
honor his payroll checks. Again, as in the case at bar, the depositor might indicate
to the bank that it desires its services in paying interest on bonds. Many courts
seem to think that the mere fact that a bank agrees to assist in some such special
purpose of the depositor, indicates that the funds deposited are -not to be used in
the bank's business.8 They are to be set aside and devoted only to the purpose
indicated. Thus a rule of thumb has been adopted by some courts, i.e., an indica-
tion by a depositor that he has some special purpose in mind, in making a deposit,
characterizes the deposit as a special deposit.
Such a rule is deplored by bankers and seems opposed to sound principles. The
New York court in the case at bar adopts a sounder construction of the intention
of the parties and points the way for other courts to follow. It indicates that the
mere fact that a depositor tells his bank that his purpose in making a deposit is
to have funds available for a particular object, does not necessarily mean that he
intends the bank to hold his deposit aside and withdraw it from the funds it has
available for its own business. Such a purpose of the depositor is consistent with
an intention to take the bank's promise, which is given in return, that it will pro-
vide funds for his purpose, to meet the checks he intends to issue, and not require
the bank to hold the deposit aside as a special deposit. He may be willing that
the bank shall use his deposit in its own business. What other profitable agreement
could a bank make when it is not carrying other accounts for the depositor and
does not make service charges for paying checks? The presumption is and should
be that a deposit is not special9 and unless the intention of the parties is clearly
that the bank may not use the funds in its own business the court should consider
deposits like those in the case at bar as general deposits for a special purpose.
The case at bar brings to mind another unfortunate distinction made in the law.
193 N. C. 696, 138 S. E. 22, 24 (1927) the court said: "A special deposit is a deposit
for safe-keeping, to be returned intact on demand . . . , the bank acquiring no property
in the thing deposited and deriving no benefit from its use. The title remains in the
depositor, who is a bailor and not a creditor of the bank."
7. For such an arrangement see Central Coal & Coke Co. v. State Bank of Bevier,
226 Mo. App. 594, 44 S. W. (2d) 188 (1931); and Equity Elevator & Trading Co. v.
Farmers' and Merchants' Bank, 64 N. D. 95, 250 N. W. 529 (1933). See also Diebold
Safe & Lock Co. v. Fulton, 46 Ohio App. 127, 187 N. E. 784 (1933),
8. Ibid. In the cases cited in note 7 supra, the banks agreed to assist in such special
purpose of the depositor, and this was said to be sufficient to justify a finding that a
special deposit was intended. Contra: Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. Berger, 105 F.
(2d) 485 (C. C. A. 3d, 1939); Erie R. C/o. v. Mizeg, 9 F. Supp. 143 (D. C. W. D.
N. Y. 1934); Craig v. Bank of Granby, 210 Mo. App. 334, 238 S. W. 507 (1922).
In Central Coal & Coke Co., 226 Mo. App. 594, 44 S. W. (2d) 188 (1931), the bank
also exacted a small revenue charge. This last fact does not definitely show a special
deposit. Service charges for active general accounts are not unusual.
9. National Bank of the Republic v. Millford, 10 Wall. 152, 155-156 (U. S. 1869);
President & Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Blake, 148 U. S. 412, 425 (1893); Collins v.
State of Florida, 33 Fla. 429, 15 So. 214, 217-218 (1894).
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Many cases seem to hold that where a deposit is made to pay interest on bonds it
can be held a general deposit and no trust arises, but where the deposit is made
to pay dividends to stockholders it will be a special deposit and a trust arises in
favor of stockholders.10 These cases seem to hold that merely because a situation
involves bondholders it can be classed in a non-trust category and if it involves
stockholders, in a trust category. Determining whether or not a trust arises should
be a matter of investigating the intention of the parties. Where it is their intention
to have the money held aside and not used by the depository in its own business
then a trust may arise and this should be the rule whether the monies are given
to him to pay stock dividends or bond interest.
COmmON LAW MARRIAGE*-CONTRACT-COHABITATION AND REPUTATION.-In 1908,
appellant and decedent entered into an oral agreemert, to which there were no
witnesses, to live together as man and wife. The decedent was to pay the bills,
and the appellant was to prepare the meals, do the laundry, and occupy his home
and bed. The parties took an occasional trip, and on such excursions registered
at various hotels as man and wife. Appellant, however, ran a boarding house and
represented the decedent to her friends, neighbors and relatives as boarder therein.
The decedent never represented the appellant as his wife, and the appellant
never used the decedent's name. The appellant brought action against the admin-
istrators for a widow's share of decedent's estate. On appeal from judgment deny-
ing appellant's petition, held, that although there was a binding contract, there
was no valid common law marriage, since the parties did not hold themselves out
as a married couple. Judgment affirmed. Schihing v. Parsons, 36 N. E. (2d) 958
(App. Court of Ind. 1941).
The principle followed by the court in deciding this case was that in addition
to a valid unwitnessed, oral agreement of marriage there must be subsequent co-
habitation,1 and a general holding out of the marriage to the public. That there
was cohabitation here, is not questioned by the court, but there was no evidence of
any "holding out' of the marriage to the public.
The court distinguished between a marriage contract which is written or one
which is oral and witnessed, on the one hand; and one, as in this case, which was
oral and unwitnessed, on the other hand. It conceded that in the first two types
10. In re Interborough Consolidated Corp., 267 Fed. 914 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1920)
(involves bonds, held, no trust); Ford v. Easthampton Rubber Thread Co., 158 Mass.
84, 32 N. E. 1036 (1893) (involves stocks, held, a trust); Searles v. Gebbie, 115 App.
Div. 778, 101 N. Y. Supp. 199 (4th dep't 1906), aff'd mein-. 190 N. Y. 533, 83 N. E. 1131
(1907) (involves stocks, held, a trust) ; Guidise v. Island Refining Corporation, 291 Fed. 922
(D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1923) (involves bonds, held, no trust); Staten Island Cricket &
Baseball Club v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 41 App. Div. 321, 58 N. Y. Supp. 460
(2d dep't 1889) (involves bonds, held, no trust).
1. Yardley's Estate, 75 Pa. St. 207, 211, (1874) "To cohabit, is to live or dwell
together; to have the same habitation; so that where one lives and dwells, there does
the other live and dwell always with him." People v. Spencer, 199 Mich. 395, 165 N. W.
921, 923 (1917) "Cohabit in this behalf means dwelling together; living in the usual manner
of married people. . ....
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of contract, no holding out is required, but under the third type, it makes cohabita-
tion and "holding out" necessary.
This distinction seems questionable. Insofar as contract law is concerned, there
is generally no difference between an oral and a written contract except with
regard to the Statute of Frauds.2 Since the Statute of Frauds is not pertinent
to a contract of marriage,3 a marriage agreement may generally be either oral or
in writing,4 and both types are treated as equally valid.
Furthermore, the principle applied by the court is opposed to the sounder view
that "holding out" is not required. This sounder view is one which rests the
validity of the marriage upon the contract which supports it, and not the publicity
given it.5 The only requirements for a valid common law contract are: compe-
tency of the parties to contract, free and mutual consent, and a present agreement.6
Subsequent cohabitation is not required to perfect a marriage under this view.
Cohabitation and publication are universally recognized as some evidence of a valid
marriage contract but it is submitted that such evidence is neither conclusive
nor required. 7 If cohabitation is not required, it seems illogical to require publication.
Furthermore, the Teter case, s upon which the principal case relies, does not seem
to be supporting authority. In that case, there was a "holding out" of the marriage
by the parties, and a subsequent formal ceremony. The court accepts this as good
evidence of the marriage. But the court does not say that it would find the
2. 1 W VrrsToN, CONTRACTs (1936) § 12.
3. RE TAT~mENT, CONTRACrS (1932) § 178.
4. In re Seymour, 113 Misc. 421, 185 N. Y. S. 373, (1920); Love v. Love, 185 Iowa
930, 171 N. W. 257 (1919). It has been wel argued that the state is a third party
to each marriage contract. MADOEN, Domrzsrc RELATioNs (1931) § 19, Wade v. Kalb-
fleisch, 58 N. Y. 282 (1874), KEEz=a, MAsRIACE AND DIVORCE (2d ed. 1923) § 74. Certain
restrictions may be placed on marriage contracts for the good of the state as held in
Grigsby v. Reib, 105 Tex. 597, 153 S. W. 1124 (1913). But marriages solemnized in
accordance with restrictions rest ultimately upon a contractual basis. Davis v. Davis,
119 Conn. 194, 175 Ati. 574 (1934). Jackson v. Winne, 7 Wend. 47 (N. Y. 1831).
Marriage contracts, either solemnized or at common law, are of equal importance and
validity. MADDm, op. cit. supra § 20-21, N. Y. Dom. RzrE. LAW § 10. '
5. U. S. v. Simpson, 4 Utah 227, 7 Pac. 257 (1885). in re Hulett's Estate, 66 Minn.
327, 69 N. W. 31 (1896). New York only requires proof of a contract, and definitely
asserts that no cohabitation is required. See Caujolle v. Ferrie, 23 N. Y. 90, 106 (1861).
See note 6 infra. New York has followed this doctrine throughout its history. Hall,
Commont Law Marriage in New York State (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 1.
6. "If copula follows, it adds nothing in law, though it may aid the proof of marriage."
BIsHoP, MARRIAGE, DrVoRcE, and SEPARATION, (1891) § 315; U. S. v. Simpson, 4 Utah
227, 7 Pac. 257 (1885); Tiuna v. Willmott, 162 Okl. 42, 19 P. (2d) 145 (1933).. For
sufficiency of evidence see Comment, (1935) 21 CORNELL L. Q. 122. In re Seymour, 113
Misc. 421, 185 N. Y. S. 373 (1920). For the most part, however, where the courts find
a contract, there is usually some evidence of cohabitation.
7. BisHoP, M IARRIE, DrvORCE, AND SEPARATION, (1981) §§ 314, 315; Note, (1919)
3 MrNN. L. REy. 426; Davis v. Stoufer, 132 Mo. App. 112 S. W. 282 1908).
8. Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129 (1884). Cf. In re Heitman's Estate, 154 Misc. 838,




common law marriage contract invalid if the "holding out" or a formal ceremony
had not been established. Another problem arises if the doctrine of the principal
case is applied. Cohabitation is a permanent status,9 and the process of "holding
out" apparently takes more than a day. However, "at each particular moment
of the existence of a person, he must be either married or single; there is no
intermediate condition". 10  When, therefore, is "holding out" accomplished and
when do the parties to the contract become married?
Although they are receiving more and more legislative attention, common law
marriages are still objects of judicial cognizance." What, therefore, should be the
court's attitude in treating a case where there is an oral, unwitnessed contract of
marriage? For purposes of public policy and to prevent fraud, strong proof of
the marriage contract should be required. 12 As a practical matter, this proof is
usually supplied by showing cohabitation and publication. However, where the
contract is conclusively proved by other evidence, the absence of proof of cohabita-
tion and "holding out" should not be allowed to defeat the marriage. 13
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALDITY or HANDBILL ORDiNANCEs.-Plaintiff owned a sub-
marine and desired to exhibit it for a fee to the public. He sought to lease a berth
at a pier owned by the City of New York. Upon the City's refusal he obtained
a state-owned pier and designed a circular to advertise the presence of the submarine.
Being informed that distribution of such commercial circular violated a city or-
dinance, he drew a circular announcing, on one side, the presence of the submarine
and bearing on the reverse side, a printed protest against the city's refusal of a
berth for his ship. Defendant, the Police Commissioner of the City of New York,
restrained its distribution. Plaintiff brought action for, and obtained, an injunction
in the District Court' perpetually enjoining defendant from enforcing the regula-
tion against distribution of plaintiff's handbills. Upon appeal from the district
court, held, one judge dissenting, insofar as it prevents distribution of a circular con-
taining a combined protest and advertisement, the ordinance is repugnant to the
9. Yardley's Estate, 75 Pa. St. 207, 211 (1874); People v. Spencer, 199 Mich. 395,
165 N. W. 921, 923 (1917).
10. Bishop, op. cit. supra, note 4, § 317.
11. This problem has been largely curtailed by the passing of legislation in most of
our states, including N. Y. Dom. Ran. LAW § 11; (1-5) LAWS or 1933, c. 606. How-
ever, these statutes are not retroactive, and this problem will appear again and again for
many years. N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 11, (42); Matter of Mabel, 153 Misc. 228, 274
N. Y. Supp. 625 (1934).
12. In Davis v. Stoufer, 132 Mo. App. 555, 112 S. W. 282, 285 (1908) the court said,
"It has been said that a contract incapable of proof is for practical purposes no contract,
since, if it is not shown by believable evidence it cannot be known that it exists."
13. The purpose of this is well stated in Teter v. Teter, 101 Ind. 129, 51 Am. Rep. 742,
where the court said at p. 745, "The law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage,
and not concubinage; legitimacy, and not bastardy. . . ." Cf. Dalrymple v. Dalrymple,
2 Hagg. Con. 51, 161 Eng. Rep. R. 665 (1884).
1. 34 F. Supp. 596 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
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guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. Judgment affirmed.
Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F. (2d) 511 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
Thus appears another case2 involving the validity of municipal prohibitions against
the distribution of handbills in streets and public places. The prohibition herein is
found in the New York City Sanitary Code3 and applies to "commercial and business
advertising matter". Plaintiff insists he is being deprived of the rights of freedom
of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First Amendment and extended by
the Fourteenth Amendment. It is well settled that freedom of speech and freedom
of the press, protected by the First Amendment from infringement by Congress,
are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment from unreasonable invasion by state action.4 Likewise
it is agreed that municipal ordinances adopted under state authority constitute
state action and are within the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 Under
this general guarantee of the fundamental rights of a person the state, nevertheless,
has authority to enact reasonable laws to promote the health, safety, morals and
general welfare of its people.6
2. Other cases are Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); Schneider v.
State of New Jersey, Town of Irvington, 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Hague v. C. I. 0., 307
U. S. 496 (1939); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. California,
310 U. S. 106 (1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U, S. 296 (1940).
3. NvW YOEX SANITARY CODE, § 318 (Health Department Regulations, Art. III, § 318),
which reads as follows:
"Handbills, cards, circulars.-No person shall throw, cast or distribute, or cause or
permit to be thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill, circular, card, booklet, placard
or other advertising matter whatsoever, in or upon any street or public place, or in a
front yard or court yard, or on any stoop, or in the vestibule or any hall of any building,
or in a letter box therein; provided, that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to
prohibit or otherwise regulate the delivery of any such matter by the United States
postal service, or prohibit the distribution of sample copies of newspapers regularly sold
by the copy or by annual subscription. This section is not intended to prevent the
lawful distribution of anything other than commercial and business advertising matter."
4. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 666 (1923); Whitney v. State of California,
274 U. S. 357, 373 (1927); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 368 (1931); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 707 (1931); Grosjean v. Amer. Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 244
(1936); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
5. Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20 (1907); Home Tel. and
Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278 (1913); Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Akron,
240 U. S. 462 (1916).
6. The laws in the following cases were upheld as constitutional: In re Wong Yung
Quy, 2 Fed. 624 (C. C. A. 9th 1880) (law prohibiting burial custom dangerous to the
health); Owens v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 110, 116 Pac. 345 (1911) (law punishing person
who denied medical aid to his child); Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145, 166 (1878)
(statute punishing those practicing bigamy); Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. U. S., 140 U. S. 665 (1890) (state revoked charter granted to
corporation because of its religious beliefs and practices); Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 148
Mass. 375, 19 N. E. 225 (1889) (ordinance prohibiting comet playing without a license).
But such legislative intervention can find constitutional justification only by dealing with
the abuse of rights; the rights themselves cannot be curtailed. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U. S. 353, 364 (1937).
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In the instant case the majority,7 in holding for the plaintiff, relied on Schneider
v. State of New Jersey8 which stamped four ordinances9 as unconstitutional. Speak-
ing through Mr. Justice Roberts, in that case, the court held' 0 that the mere
desire to keep streets clean was not a ground to prohibit persons rightfully on
streets from handing out literature to willing receivers. The resulting burden of
cleaning up, was the price paid for the right of free speech. It was suggested that
punishment for the actual street litterers would prevent such uncleanliness.
The handbills involved in the Schneider case were not commercial advertising.
Whether the present handbill is such is a question open to some doubt. The present
opinion gives plaintiff the benefit of the doubt in this borderline". case, on whether
the handbill is "primarily commercial",' 2 and refuses to class it as such because
the plaintiff had profit in mind.' 3 On the other hand, the long dissent argues that
the hand-bill herein was "wholly commercial"'14 and therefore within the scope of
the ordinance. The dissent makes much of the fact that the primary motive of the
plaintiff was profit. But it is beyond the police power of the states to interfere
arbitrarily with a lawful business.15 Even if the advertising were commercial the
statute might be invalid as such an arbitrary interference. The statute in question
seems to be quite arbitrary because it prevents the distribution of commercial hand-
bills in any manner. It seems that the minority used the same line of reasoning
followed in the majority opinion of the recent "Flag Salute" case,16 and strained
to support legislation merely because a state legislature had enacted it.
17
7. 122 F. (2d) 511, 514 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
8. 308 U. S. 147 (1939).
9. Schneider v. State decided four cases at the same time since ordinances involved
were nearly the same in all four. Young v. California, 3 Cal. App. (2d) 62, 85 P. (2d)
231 (1938) (defendant distributed handbills announcing a meeting of the "Friends of
the Lincoln Brigade"); Nichols et al. v. Massachusetts, 18 N. E. (2d) 166 (Mass. 1938)
(defendants distributed leaflets describing meeting to he held to protest manner of
administration of state unemployment insurance system); Snyder v. Milwaukee, 230
Wis. 131, 238 N. W. 301 (1939) (leaflets were distributed by a picket in a labor con-
troversy); Schneider v. Irvington, 121 N. J. L. 542, 3 Ati. (2d) 609 (1939) (defendant,
one of "Jehovah's Witnesses", left religious pamphlets at the homes she visited). The
Schneider and Snyder cases came up on certiorari, the Young and Nichols cases on appeal.
For full historical and general coverage of the subject of handbills, see Lindsay, Council and
Court: The Handbill Ordinances, 1889-1939, (1941) 39 Micn. L. Rav. 561-96. See also
Comment, (1940) 35 .LL. L. REv. 90.
10. 308 U. S. 147, 162 (1939).
11. Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F. (2d) 511, 515 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
12. Criticism of suggested "commercial" distinction is made in (1938) 5 U. or Cm.
L. REv. 675, 676. But see (1940) 35 ILL. L. Rv. 90, 94. See also (1940) 24 M--N.
L. Rv. 570; (1940) 13 So. CAi-r. L. REV. 253; (1940) 25 WASH. U. L. Q. 611; Lindsay,
Council and Court: The Handbill Ordinances, 1889-1939 (1941) 39 MAcH. L. Rav. 561,
580, 589, 593.
13. Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F. (2d) 511, 516 (C. C. A. 2d 1941) note 6.
14. Id. at 518.
15. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 400 (1923); Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278
U. S. 105, 111 (1928); Allgeyer v. La., 165 U. S. 578, 589 (1897).
16. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940).
17. (1941) 6 Mo. L. Rrv. 106; (1940) 15 ST. JoHN's L. Ray. 95.
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That the case under consideration is one of first instance,' 8 there cannot be much
doubt. How the Supreme Court19 will rule no one can say. Its decision will be
another landmark in the series of cases on the subject of handbill ordinances,
which should tend to settle the law on the topic. Coupled with the tendency toward
censorship resulting from the critical and troublous times through which we are
passing,20 decisions, to a greater extent, may be expected to reflect these con-
ditions.21 So it would seem, that there is a possible chance that the Supreme
Court might reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
DOmESTIC RELATIONS-ACTION FOR MALICIOUS PROSECUTION FOR OBTAINING A
FOREIGN DIVORC.-The defendant-wife, acting upon the advice of her attorney, in
good faith, went to Nevada where she obtained a divorce by default. While her
action was pending, the plaintiff-husband obtained a declaratory judgment in Connecti-
cut, the state of their domicile, stating that the defendant-wife's residence in Nevada
was merely a colorable one for the purpose of securing a divorce. The defendant-
wife, after having obtained the divorce returned to New York, whereupon the
plaintiff-husband instituted this suit for malicious prosecution in accordance with
Connecticut law,' the state where his cause of action arose. On motion, held, that
the complaint should be dismissed on the merits because plaintiff failed to show
that prosecutiqn originated in the malice of the defendant and was without probable
cause. Weidlich v. Weidlich, 30 N. Y. S. (2d) 326 (1941).
The New York Supreme Court, admitting the novelty of the husband's suit for
malicious prosecution of the divorce, correctly dismissed the complaint in this case
in view of the common law and the statute involved. The plaintiff failed to make
out a cause of action under the theory of malicious prosecution. As was said in
Burt v. Smitl, 2 "While malice is the root of the action, malice alone even when
18. People v. Rollo, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 350, 353 (Mag. Ct. Bronx Co. 1940).
19. Cert. granted. No. 707, October Term 1941. Order allowing cert. filed Nov.
24, 1941.
20. Chaffee, Freedom of Speec in War Time (1919) 32 Hxv. L. Rxv. 932. See also
CHAm E, FREE SPEEC IN Tj UNITED STATES (1941).
21. Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47 (1919). Mr. Justice Holmes here stated that war
time cuts down on individual liberty when it is found to be a hindrance to the war
effort. At page 52, he said: "But the character of every act depends upon the circum-
stances in which it is done. The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic".
1. CONN. GEi, . STAT. (rev. 1918) § 6148, now CoxN. GEN. STAT. (rev. 1930) § 6000.
"Treble damages for vexatious suit. If any person shall commence and prosecute any
suit or complaint against another, in his own name, or the name of others, without
probable cause, and with a malicious intent unjustly to vex and trouble him, he shall
pay him treble damages." The plaintiff's right to maintain a tort action against his
spouse in N. Y. is established in: N. Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 57: "Right of action by or
against married woman by husband or wife against the other, for torts. .. .A married
woman .. . is liable to her husband for her wrongful or tortious acts resulting in any
such personal injury to her husband or his property, as if they were unmarried."
2. 181 N. Y. 1, 5, 73 N. E. 495, 496 (1905).
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extreme, is not enough, for want of probable cause must also be shown." It has
long been held that if a party acts in good faith upon the advice of an attorney,
(however erroneous that opinion might be) after having fully and fairly laid all
the facts of his case before that attorney he has a complete defense to a suit
for malicious prosecution. 3 The sworn deposition of the defendant's two attorneys
(one in Nevada and another in Connecticut) as to this fact, destroyed any cause
of action the plaintiff might have had.4
The case emphasizes the fact that the remedy of a plaintiff, whose spouse seeks
an unconscionable foreign divorce, is inadequate at law. It raises the question
whether public policy would counsel an extension of the powers of equity to make
it mandatory for a court to issue an injunction when an applicant seeks to restrain
a divorce action in a foreign jurisdiction, brought on only colorable grounds.
In equity,5 it is very difficult to restrain the maintenance of divorce actions in
foreign jurisdictions. The difficulty of applying to equity for a remedy is shown in
Goldstein v. Goldstein.6 The plaintiff-wife there sought to restrain the defendant-
husband from obtaining a Florida divorce by showing that she would be irreparably
damaged, and that she was financially unable to defend the divorce. The court
refused to grant the decree and took a "point of view which is opposed to essential
considerations of natural justice, particularly within the domain of equity.' 7 The
court argued that the "plaintiff has nothing to fear from the action which her
husband has sought to bring against her" because Florida was not the matrimonial
domicile. This seems to be answered by Loughran, J., in his dissenting opinion,9
when he pointed out that the husband may undertake another marriage on the
strength of the Florida decree. His second wife would then have tangible and
practical quasi-matrimonial claims upon him for support which the courts would
recognize.1o Clearly the wife's chances of recovery against her husband for support
3. Ames v. Rathbun, 55 Barb. 194 (N. Y. 1869); Richardson v. Virtue, 2 Hun. 203
(N. Y. 1874); Hall v. Suydam, 6 Barb. 83 (N. Y. 1849); Lathrop v. Mathers, 143 App.
Div. 376, 128 N. Y. Supp. 492 (1st Dep't 1911) ; (1932) 31 1IcE. L. Rnv. 139, 140; (1934)
2 KAN. L. Rnv. 217, 218; Brodrib v. Doberstein, 107 Conn. 294, 140 Atl. 483 (1928).
4. It is suggested by HARPER, THE LAW or TORTS (1933) 584-585, that the plaintiff
must also allege that the previous suit was "terminated in the plaintiff's favor" and
that the defendant's claim was baseless. Here the divorce suit was terminated in
defendant's favor.
5. Wormser, Injunctions Against Prosecutions of Divorce Actions in Other States (1940)
9 FoRDHAM L. Rzv. 376.
6. 283 N. Y. 146, 27 N. E. (2d) 969 (1940).
7. Wormser, supra note 5, at 378.
8. 283 N. Y. 146, 148 (1940).
9. Id. at 149, 150.
10. Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 360, 26 N. E. (2d) 290, 292 (1940). This
case held that the second wife can sue for her support although concededly the second
marriage is invalid. For as was said, "it is not open to defendant in these proceedings
to avoid the responsibility which he voluntarily incurred." The Baumann case (infra,
note 11) held that the first wife may not get an injunction to restrain the second wife
from using the name of her spouse, even though the marriage by which she received
that name might be invalid. In Lowe v. Lowe, 265 N. Y. 197, 192 N. E. 291 (1934),
the first wife sought to obtain an injunction to restrain her husband and his second wife
from representing themselves as married and said injunction was refused.
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would be decreased. Her standard of living might have to be lowered. Certainly
this subjects the plaintiff-wife to enough inconveniences, hardships, troubles and
expenses for equity to intervene and protect the rights of the oppressed party.
Probably the most feasible way of eradicating this hesitancy of equity courts
to grant injunctions is by legislative fiat. A statute should make it mandatory for
equity to grant the injunction after the defendant's residence in a foreign state
has been adjudicated merely colorable. To expect that courts might enlarge the
legal cause of action for malicious prosecution, as the plaintiff here evidently did,
is to expect them to run counter to well-settled doctrines of stare decisis. However,
if the Legislature would enact a statute compelling the equity court to act, the
inequities of oppression and hardship caused in the Baumann case,'1 the Krause
case,' 2 and similar cases, would be obliterated.
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTs-THiRD PARTY BENEFICIARIEs.-The United States,
through the Secretary of the Interior, contracted with the defendant for the con-
struction of a library building at Howard University in the District of Columbia,
under authority of the National Industrial Recovery Act.' The Secretary of the
Interior requested the defendant to furnish a performance and payment bond
in accordance with the provisions of the Miller Act.2 Noland furnished materials
to a subcontractor but was never paid for it. On appeal from a judgment denying
a motion to dismiss a suit brought by the United States on a payment bond for
the use of Noland, held, the provisions of the Miller Act requiring payment bonds
to the United States apply only to construction of public buildings. Such a bond
cannot be enforced by the government as a private obligation.
The court felt that even though Congress authorized the expenditure of W. P. A.
funds for the erection of the Howard University Library, the nature of the building
was not changed; it remained private. Irwin et al. v. United States to the Use of
Noland Co., Inc., 122 F. (2d) 73 (D. C. App. 1941).
The instant case considered the previous decision of Maiatico Construction Co.,
Inc. v. United States,3 which dealt with identical facts. In that decision, the court
exhaustively reviewed the status of work done under the Heard Act 4 for Howard
11. Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929).
12. Krause v. Krause, 282 N. Y. 355, 26 N. E. (2d) 290 (1940). For a complete
discussion of this case see Kane, Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees in New York
(1940) 9 FoRDrrma L. REV. 242.
1. 48 STAT. 201 (1933) 40 U. S. C. A. § 402 (Supp. 1940).
2. 49 STAT. 793 (1935) 40 U. S. C. A. § 270a (Supp. 1940) states in effect that before
any person is awarded a contract to do public work a performance and payment bond
must be furnished to guarantee performance of the work and to protect all material-men.
Section 270b (Supp. 1940) gives the material-men the right to sue on the above payment
bond for unpaid balance in the name of the United States.
3. 79 F. (2d) 418 (D. C. App. 1935).
4. 28 STAr. 278 (1894) as amended, 33 STAT. 311 (1905) 40 U. S. C. A. § 270. This
statute, referred to as the HEARD Acr, was passed in recognition of the inability of sub-
contractors to take liens upon the public property of the United States and provided an
authorization to require from the contractor a payment bond for the benefit of subcon-
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University, and concluded that Howard University was a private institution since
it served private purposes and interests. The use of federal funds was held
not to change the character of work done for such an institution so as to bring it
within the provision of the Heard Act, which applied only to the construction of
public buildings of the United States. The court also concluded that the enactment
of the Miller Act, superseding the Heard Act, produced procedural changes only and
did not alter the definition of public work.
The decision upon the facts reported is undoubtedly correct and supported by
precedent.5 The United States as plaintiff, lacking the statutory authorization of
the Miller Act,0 was not the proper party in interest, and could not maintain
an action as on a statutory bond.7 A recovery under the theory of a voluntary bond
was barred because the United States can enter into binding contracts only where
a statute creates the authority to do so.8  However, the court in the last paragraph
of the decision commented upon the obvious inequity of the result, and thus
invites discussion of what might be done to arrive at a more equitable solution.
The simplest and safest solution would be to revamp the Miller Act to permit
the instant action.
With removal of the United States as a Use plaintiff, the facts suggest a direct
suit by the subcontractor as a third-party beneficiary under the doctrine of Lawrence
v. Fox.0 This doctrine has the approval of the majority of the state courts'0 and
also of the Federal Courts'" and would be a suitable basis for a claim, pro-
vided that the payment bond given by the defendant to the United States could
be upheld for the purpose of this action. This question has been the subject of
tractors. The practical effect of the Act was the substitution of the bond for the building
on which a lien, because of its public nature, could not exist.
S. See note 3, supra. See also, Peterson v. Unifed States, 119 F. (2d) 145 (C. C. A.
6th 1941) where the Maiatico case is cited with approval.
6. Supra, note 2.
7. United States v. Faircloth, 265 Fed. 963 (D. C. App. 1920); Penn Iron Co. v.
Trigg Co., 106 Va. 557, 56 S. E. 329 (1907); United States v. Empire Stafes Surety Co.,
114 App. Div. 755, 100 N. Y. Supp. 247 (1906).
8. See note 7 supra.
9. 20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
10. Byram Lumber & Supply Co. v. Page, 109 Conn. 256, 146 Atl. 293 (1929);
Miller v. Farr, 178 Ind. 36, 98 N. E. 805 (1912); Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Weidinger,
73 N. J. L. 433, 64 Atl. 179 (1906); First City Trust & Savings Bank v. Doolittle, 36
Ohio App. 218, 173 N. E. 19 (1930). Cf. Orenberg v. Horan, 269 Mass. 312, 168 N. E.
794 (1929).
11. Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 U. S. 143 (1876); Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. N. Y. City
Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 721, 750 (C. C. A. 2d 1912); United States v. Union Metallic Cartridge
Co., 265 Fed. 349, 353 (D. C. Conn. 1920). See also Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries
of Contractor's Surety Bonds (1928) 38 YAIx L. J. 1. For the law of the District
of Columbia see Willard v. Wood, 135 U. S. 309 (1890) and 164 U. S. 502 (1896) where
the court stated that in the District of Columbia an action at law of a third party
beneficiary could not be maintained; but under the doctrine of Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S.
610, 621 (1890) such a recovery may be had in equity. To the same effect see Van
Senden v. Wilkinson, 76 F. (2d) 151 (D. C. App. 1935); De Leon v. Rhines, 74 F. 477
(D. C. App. 1934).
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many decisions which mainly uphold the third-party beneficiaries' rights.12 Re-
cently in a well reasoned New York decision, McClare v. Massachusetts Bonding and
Trust Company,' 3 recovery was permitted, despite the invalidity of the bond between
the contracting parties, on the ground that the defendant surety is estopped from
asserting the invalidity of the bond. Applied to the case under discusson, this
decision would permit Noland to recover if he knew of the existence of the bond
and supplied the material in reliance thereon. Other cases go even further and
permit the laborer and material-men to avail themselves of the protection of a
bond regartUess of their actual knowledge. 14 It seems therefore, that Noland should
be able to recover under the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox.
LIBEL AND SLANDER-STATUTORY EXTENSION OF TnE DEFENSE OF ABSOLUTE
IMMUNITY.-Allegedly, in pursuance of a conspiracy to injure plaintiff, the defendants,
President of a state university and Dean of its medical school, at a session of the
Board of Regents of the University, made derogatory statements concerning plain-
tiff's fitness as librarian. This board was charged with the statutory duty of govern-
ing the University "in all its interests". On an appeal from an order sustaining a
demurrer to the petition which alleged that the statements were made with an evil
intent to injure the plaintiff, and that as a result thereof plaintiff was discharged
and suffered actual damages, held, in making said statements, the defendants were
acting "in the proper discharge of an official duty" within the meaning of the statute
defining privileged communications, and that the occasion upon which the report
was made was absolutely privileged. Hughes v. Bizzel et al., 117 P. (2d) 763 (Sup. Ct.
Oklahoma, 1941).
Courts recognizing the defense of absolute privilege or immunity1 as one in
which the existence of malice is irrelevant, have limited the situations, as a general
rule,2 to judicial and legislative proceedings. This immunity was extended in Spalding
v. Vilas3 to proceedings of important executive officers when the Supreme Court of
12. Kansas City Hydraulic Press Brick Co. v. National Surety Co., 149 Fed. 507, 512
(C. C. IV. D. Mo. 1906); American Bonding Co. v. Dickey, 74 Kan. 791, 88 Pac. 66
(1906); Mississippi Fire Insurance Co. v. Evans, 153 Miss. 635, 120 So. 738 (1929).
13. 266 N. Y. 371, 195 N. E. 15 (1935).
14. Griffith v. Stucker, 91 Kan. 47, 136 Pac. 937 (1913); United States Gypsum
Co. v. Gleason, 135 Wis. 539, 116 N. W. 238 (1908); Baker v. Bryan, 64 Iowa 561, 21 N.
W. 83 (1884); Toner v. Long, 79 N. H. 458, 111 Atl. 311 (1920).
1. Immunity seems the more accurate term, although not adopted by the Courts.
See Evans, Legal Immunity for Defamation (1940) 24 MqN. L. REV. 607, 613. Green,
Relational Interests (1935) 30 ILL. L. Rxv. 314; Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defanm-
tion (1910) 10 COL. L. REv. 129.
2. Communications between husband and wife and publications to which plaintiff
has given his consent are privileged utterances in the same 'class. See R.STATEMENT,
Toms (1934) § 592; Campbell v. Bannister, 79 Ky. 205, 2 Ky. Law Rep. 72 (1800);
Chapman v. Ellesmore, [1932] 2 K. B. 431.
3. 161 U. S. 483 (1896) (Postmaster-General]. Mellon v. Brewer, 57 D. C. App. 126,
18 F. (2d) 168 (1927) [Secretary of Treasury]. To same effect, Chatterton v. Secre-
tary of State for India [1895] 2 Q. B. 189.
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the United States in 1896 gave absolute immunity to the head of an executive
department of the government. In the latter case, the Postmaster General when
issuing checks on claims, issued a circular to claimants who had engaged plaintiff
as counsel, which gave the impression that plaintiff's services were entirely unneces-
sary, and thus worked an injury upon him in his profession. The court stated that
the same general considerations of public policy and convenience which require that
judicial officers should not be amenable to civil actions for their judicial acts apply
to a large extent to official communications made by heads of executive depart-
ments in the discharge of duties imposed upon them by law; and the postmaster-
general was held not liable, regardless of any personal or malicious motive that
may have prompted his action. Since then, in later Federal cases, the protection
has been widened in scope so as to include communications and reports of sub-
ordinate officials of the government to their superiors, when engaged in the discharge
of duties, imposed upon them by law.4 However, the doctrine has been rejected
where the communication was made by members of a school board of the District
of Columbia rather than by an official of the Executive Department of the Govern-
ment.5 It would seem that Federal jurisdictions are apparently inclined to limit
the extension of absolute immunity to officials of the Executive Branch of the
government.
The state courts are not uniform in extending absolute immunity to communications
made by public officials in discharge of official duty.6 The general tendency shows
a reluctance 7 on the part of the Courts to extend the doctrine in the absence of
statutory authority. Thus, there is considerable authority that minor officials, such
as a superintendent of a government school,8 the principal of an institution for deaf
mutes,9 a postmaster,10 or a member of an investigating committee" and others'
2
are entitled only to a qualified immunity or privilege.
4. De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 D. C. App. 167 (1904) (Report by the Chief of War
Dep't, record and pension office); Farr v. Valentine, 38 D. C. App. 413 (1912) (Com-
missioner of Indian Affairs); Miles v. McGrath, 4 F. Supp. 603 (D. C. Md. 1933) (Com-
munication by naval officer pursuant to orders was held to be absolutely privileged).
Cf. Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233 (1880) (denying absolute immunity to head of Naval
Academy on authorized report.) Harwood v. McMurtry, 22 F. Supp. 572 (W. D. Ky.
1938) (a federal internal revenue officer).
5. Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U. S. 165 (1913).
6. Roche v. O'Connell, 66 Conn. 223, 29 Atl. 473 (1895); Barry v. McCollom, 81 Conn.
293, 70 Atl. 1035 (1908); Mundy v. Hoard, 216 Mich. 478, 185 N. W. 872 (1921);
Raymond v. Crall, 233 Mich. 268, 206 N. W. 556 (1925).
7. Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 321, 135 N. E. 515 (1922). A statement was made
by an officer of a law enforcement society to a district attorney charging the plaintiff
with crime based on an unverified report. The court said: "But while no authority
controls us, the tendency of our courts is to restrict the rule of absolute privilege rather
than to extend it .... We have said impliedly that the rule applies only to a proceeding in
Court or one before an' officer having attributes similar to a court. It is not applied
'to proceedings which though official and public, are not in substance judicial, . . ." [Citing
Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440 (1918)].
8. Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233 (1880).
9. Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N. Y. 517, 34 N. E. 342 (1893).
10. Petterson v. Steenerson, 113 Minn. 87, 129 N. W. 147 (1910).
11. In re Investigating Commission, 16 R. I. 751, 11 Atl. 429 (1887); Howland v.
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Although absolute privilege has been judicially criticized as an unwarranted
encroachment on personal rights,13 some states14 seem to have enacted an extension
by granting the privilege to communications made "in the proper discharge of
an official duty. .. ." It is with the interpretation of this proviso, under the
Oklahoma statute, that the instant case deals. Despite the liberal decision above
set forth in the Hughes case, it is submitted that the interpretation that such enact-
ments give only a qualified privilege would seem to be more in accord with the
intent of the legislature. The adjective "proper" qualifies the occasion and restricts
the scope under which the privilege is given. If the Oklahoma statute embraces an
absolute privilege then a dishonest or malicious exercise of superior authority would
be held to be proper and within the protection of the statute.
TORTS-GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY-LIABILITY OF QUASI-PUBLIC INSTITUTION FOR
NEGLIGENCE OF EMPLOYEE.-Defendant is a private institution authorized by the legis-
lature to care for delinquent minors. Plaintiff was committed to its care and sustained
injuries by reason of the negligence of one of defendant's employees. On appeal from a
judgment of the Appellate Division, which reversed the trial court and dismissed the
complaint, held, the state has waived its immunity from liability for the negligent
acts of its "officers and employees",' therefore, an agent of the state may no longer
assert such immunity in its own behalf.2  Judgment reversed. Bloom v. Jewish
Board of Guardians, 286 N. Y. 349, 36 N. E. (2d) 617 (1941).
The instant case is one of a recent series exhibiting a departure from the rule
of law which granted to the state and its agents, an exemption from liability for
governmental acts. In 1928, the Court of Appeals said that public duties, properly
called "governmental", included, among others, the functions of fire and police
Flood, 160 Mass. 509, 36 N. E. 482 (1894); Weber v. Lane, 99 Mo. App. 69, 71 S. W.
1099 (1903).
12. Forsythe v. Durham, 270 N. Y. 141, 200 N. E. 674 (1936) (Report of H. S.
Principal to Board of Education on rumor of student's pregnancy). Nunan v. Bullman, 256
App. Div. 741, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 51 (3rd dep't 1939) (a privilege of member of Board of
Education in reply to inquiry at instigation of plaintiff, held destroyed by utterance made
with knowledge of falsity of charges).
13. See White v. Nicholls, 3 How. 266, 288 (U. S. 1845); Dawkins v. Paulef, L. R.
5 Q. B. 94, 110 (1869); Pecue v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 321, 135 N. E. 515 (1922).
14. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1923) § 47; MONT. REV. CODE9 (Choate, 1921) § 5692;
N. D. Comp. LAWS ANx. (1913) § 4354; 12 Oxi.. ST. AxN. 1443; S. D. RLT. CODE (1919)
§ 99.
1. COURT OF CLAnis AcT § 12-a, N. Y. Laws 1929 c. 467; now § 8 N. Y. Laws 1939
c. 860. Under this section the state has waived its immunity from liability and has
consented to have the same determined according to the rules that apply to actions
between individuals and corporations in the supreme court. The words "officers and
employees" which appeared in § 12-a have been omitted from § 8; and Bloom case is
apparently the first to reach the Court of Appeals since the amendment.
2. Cf. Corbett v. St. Vincent's Industrial School, 177 N. Y. 16, 68 N. E. 992 (1903)
where an institution like that in the principal case was held to be within the govern-
mental immunity of the state.
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protection, and the protection of health and the administration of public charities,
noting that in these fields the rule of non-liability prevailed.8 Today, in New York,
this field of governmental immunity is disappearing.
The series of cases includes Paige v. State of New York, 4 where the plaintiff
was committed to a privately owned reformatory pursuant to a statute. There she
was put to work operating a complicated machine without first having been given
adequate instruction. As a result, she was injured. The state was held liable and
a liberal construction was given to section 12-a (now section 8) of the Court of
Claims Act. The holding was that officers and employees of the agent of the state
were officers and employees of the state itself.5 In Crandall v. City of Amsterdam,6
the defandant municipality was held liable for injuries to a pedestrian resulting
from a fall on ice, formed on the sidewalk by the freezing of water used by the
city fire department in putting out a fire. Liability was imposed, though under its
charter7 the city was not to be liable unless it had express notice of the condition;
and apparently the city in its corporate- character, had no express notice thereof.8
In Volk v. City of New York, 9 the defendant municipality was held liable for in-
juries suffered by plaintiff, a nurse, as a result of negligent treatment administered
in an infirmary for nurses, which was a part of a public hospital. A solution used
for an injection had been allowed to decompose. The court put the decision on
the ground that the hospital was fulfilling its contractual duty so to treat plaintiff
and was not performing a governmental function. It was said inter alia that the
negligence was connected with administrative duties and governmental immunity
does not protect the municipality in such a case. A nurse whose duties are ordinarily
considered professional, had treated the infection. These cases mark a tendency
in New York away from the doctrine of governmental immunity in tort. o They
not only indicate a departure by legislative enactment, but also by judicial decision
and liberal interpretation of statute by the courts.
This trend is demonstrated by other cases dealing with tort liability of municipal
corporations. In these cases, without the aid of statute, such municipalities have
been held liable for negligent acts.11 They disclose a substantial modification of
the doctrine that in the exercise of powers "proprietary and private" a municipality
is liable for negligent acts of officers and employees, but not for those done in
3. Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 204-205, 163 N. E. 732, 734 (1928).
4. 269 N. Y. 352, 199 N. E. 617 (1935).
5. Lehman, J., who dissented in the Paige case, followed its reasoning and reached a
similar result when he wrote for the court in the Bloom case.
6. 280 N. Y. 527, 19 N. E. (2d) 926 (1939).
7. See N. Y. Laws 1911 c. 242, as amended by N. Y. Laws 1917 c. 310.
8. See also Cosgrove v. City of Newburgh, 273 N. Y. 542, 7 N. E. (2d) 683 (1937).
9. 284 N. Y. 279, 30 N. E. (2d) 596 (1940). Note (1941) 10 BROOxLYN L. R-v. 304.
10. Apparently this departure will not be without limit. Officers and privates in
the militia have been held not to be "officers and employees" of the state in the sense
of § 12-a of the CouRt or CLAI ss Acr. Goldstein v. State of New York, 281 N. Y. 396,
24 N. E. (2d) 97 (1939). See N. Y. MILTARY LAW § 15 which states that members
of the militia shall not be liable for acts done by them while on active duty.
11. Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732 (1928); Koehler v.
City of New York, 262 N. Y. 74, 186 N. E. 208 (1933); Morse v. City of New York,
262 N. Y. 495, 188 N. E. 35 (1933).
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the exercise of powers "governmental and public".' 2 Not only are functions that
seem plainly governmental now regarded as corporate, 13 but liability has been
placed on municipalities on the theory that governmental agents may act in a
corporate capacity. 14 Thus, by narrowing the meaning of "governmental function"
the liability of municipal corporations has been extended and the distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions has correspondingly become confused. 15
Upon the basis of the foregoing cases it would seem safe to conclude that the
defense of governmental immunity will not now be recognized by the courts of
New York in any field in which that defense has not heretofore been given effect.
In this connection it should be noted that the Legislature has removed the defense
in numerous situations wherein it was formerly applicable. 16
TORTS-RECOVERY FOR FRIGHT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES WITHOUT PHYSICAL IM-
PACT.-An automobile in which plaintiff was riding was struck by a live electric
wire through the negligence of an agent of the defendant company. Plaintiff was
not struck by the wire but suffered nervous shock and fright, so that lengthy
hospitalization was required. The trial court instructed the jury that, in the
absence of any trauma caused by the application of some outside force, there could
be no recovery for fright and its consequences. On appeal from a judgment
for the defendant, held, that where it is proved that negligence proximately caused
fright or shock in one who is within the range of the physical danger from that
negligence, and this in turn produced injuries such as would be elements of damages
had a bodily injury been suffered, the injured party is entitled to a recovery.
Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 21 A. (2d) 402 (Supreme Court of Errors of Conn. 1941).
In many jurisdictions, it is held that there can be no recovery for fright and its
consequences, negligently caused, without a physical impact.' Mitchell v. R ochester
12. Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N. Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732 (1928).
13. Collentine v. City of New York, 279 N. Y. 119, 17 N. E. (2d) 792 (1938), held,
the operation, maintenance and supervision of a public park is not the exercise of a
governmental function.
14. Metzroth v. City of New York, 241 N. Y. 470, 150 N. E. 519 (1926). City
of New York held liable for negligence of employees of its building department in
allowing improper storage of building materials upon a shed over a city street. Oetprs
v. City of New York, 270 N. Y. 364, 1 N. E. (2d) 466 (1936), held, that employees of
the Bureau of Buildings may be said to be acting in a corporate capacity when they
demolished a building to safeguard a highway.
15. See 6 McQuILL N, MuTIcIPAL CORPORaTiONS (2d ed. 1937) § 2792 et seq; Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 129.
16. Liability for negligence in constructing and maintaining highways imposed upon
towns by N. Y. HIGHWAY LAW § 215 and upon counties by N: Y. CouNuT LA-W § 6.
Liability for defects in state highways imposed by N. Y. IGHWAY LAW § 58. See also
N. Y. CANAL LAW § 120 and N. Y. GENERAL MUNICIPAL LAW § 50 and subdivisions thereof.
1. Hillard v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 34 N. E. (2d) 75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941),
action to recover for death by fright due to defendant's agent telling plaintiff that she
had a cancer. Court refused a recovery because there was no trauma; Spade v. Lynn
& Boston R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897). For a good discussion of this
topic see Throckmorton, Damages for Fright (1921) 34 HARV. L. REV. 260. Edwing v.
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R. R. Co.2 is cited as a leading case. There a woman was nearly hit by a trolley
and the resulting fright caused a miscarriage. The case appears to have been decided
against the plaintiff because of the difficulty in measuring the extent of the damage
suffered and the further difficulty of establishing the foreseeability that the plaintiff
would suffer a miscarriage. It does not seem to rest on the sole ground that there
was no physical impact not to necessarily infer that in every case where physical
impact is lacking, it will be so difficult to measure damages that relief must be
denied. In tracing the development of the doctrine that there can be no recovery
without a physical impact, one finds it to be really a special exception to the
duty to exercise care against forseeable harms, 3 made to avoid the bringing of
fraudulent claims. Holmes, C. J., in Smith v. Postal Telegraph Co.,4 said that the
refusal to allow a recovery is not rested on "a logical deduction from the general
principles of liability in tort, but a limitation of those principles upon purely prac-
tical grounds." The earlier New England case of Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co.5
pointed out that many suits were arising from spurious complaints of railroad
passengers, who alleged that train noises frightened them. The inability of the crude
medical knowledge of the times, to verify the authenticity of those claims, indicated
that in the interest of the public such claims should not be permitted.6
There has been a gradual drawing away from the rigors of this doctrine since its
inception and in most jurisdictions, it has been done away with or modified. In
England, the doctrine has been abandoned 7 and likewise in many sections of our
country particularly on the Pacific coast, the Northwest and the South.8  In other
states where the doctrine has not yet been abandoned, it has been modified in practice,
if not in theory, by finding impacts or injuries that hardly merited the name.9
Pittsburg Ry. Co., 147 Pa. 40, 23 Atl. 340 (1892); Mitchell v. Rochester R. R. Co., 151
N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896); Ward v. West Jersey Ry. Co., 65 N. J. L. 383, 47
Atl. 561 (1900) where defendant closed railroad crossing obstacle trapping plaintiff's
buggy on the tracks in the path of an oncoming train, the court refused a recovery
for injuries due to fear of death.
2. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896).
3. Botticelli v. Winters, 125 Conn. 537, 542, 7 A. (2d) 443 (1939).
4. Smith v. Postal Telegraph Co., 174 Mass. 577, 55 N. E. 380 (1899); RESTATMNT,
TORTS (1932) § 436 (Caveat states that the docfrine is a matter of administrative policy
in the particular jurisdiction.) See also Homans v. Boston Elevated Ry Co., 180 Mass.
456, 458, 62 N. E. 737 (1902), which states that "The real basis for the requirement
that there shall be a contemporaneous bodily injury or battery is that this guarantees
the reality of the damage claimed".
5. Spade v. Lynn & Boston Ry. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88" (1897).
6. Id. at 89. The court after stating that public policy was opposed to numerous
fictitious claims went on to declare that if mere fright was not actionable, then injuries
caused by mental disturbances should not be the subject of a suit.
7. Hambrook v. Stokes, [1925] 1 K. B. 141, where the court allowed a recovery for
fear for the safety of another. See also Dulien v. White & Sons, [1901) 2 K. B. 669,
where the court referred to Mitchell v. Rochester, 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896)
and refufed the contentions of the N. Y. court. The court said that mere fear falls
short of real damage but the injurious consequences of fear are actual damage.
8. Clemm v. Atchinson, Topeka S. F. Ry. Co., 126 Kan. 181, 268 Pac. 103 (1928)
where plaintiff fainted and injured herself after learning that the defendant had negli-
gently misshipped her husband's coffin; Bowmen v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 AtI.
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Thus, in the recent New York case, of Comstock v. Wilson'0 the plaintiff was in
an automobile collision in which the impact was so slight that there was no damage
to either car. The plaintiff stepped down from her automobile and started to
write down the defendant's name and license number. While thus engaged, she
fainted and fell to the sidewalk fracturing her skull, an injury from which she
later died. The court declared that the collision and the consequent jar to the
passengers, no matter how slight, was a battery and an invasion of her legal rights,
and that this was sufficient to permit a recovery for her subsequent death.
It would have been a comparatively simple matter for the Connecticut court
to invent an impact in the Orbo case. It might have said that just as in cases of
wilful battery, a battery to the vehicle in which a person rides is constructively a
battery to the person."1 The court, however, openly rejected the "impact doctrine"
and decided the casd solely upon the question of forseeability of harm. In this
connection, it is to be noted that the requirement that the injury be to one who
is within the range of the ordinary physical danger from that negligence, and that
the negligent act produce injuries such as would be elements of damage in a case
where there was an impact, serve to prevent fraud. It appears that states which
follow the "impact doctrine" might better repudiate it. Recovery for authentic
claims would not then be denied.
If the courts should feel that the way would be left open for fraudulent claims,
it is to be remembered that it would be just as easy for a plaintiff to falsely testify
to a small impact, non-permanent in charater. Perhaps, imposing a special rule of
evidence in regard to claims for fright and its consequences regardless of impact
would help. The courts might require that in all such cases not only the prepon-
derance of the evidence should be necessary but that there should be "clear and
convincing" proof of the reality of the injuries claimed to have been suffered.
182 (1933) where plaintiff suffered nervous prostration in fearing for the safety of his
wife and child; Chiuchiolo v. New England Wholesalers Tailors, 84 N. H. 329, 332, 150
At. 540 (1930) explosion of pressure gauge of steam boiler directly behind plaintiff;
Frazee v. Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash. 578, 47 P. (2d) 1037 (1935) recovery for
the safety of another; Colsher v. Tennessee Electric Power Co., 84 S. W. (2d) 117 (Tenn.
App. 1935) where defendant's agents forced their way into a house to inspect meter
and plaintiff feared that they were burglars; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Kimber, 212
Ala. 102, 101 So. 827 (1924); Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 Pac. 440 (1918);
Purchell v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N. W. 1034 (1892); Bohlen &
Polickoff, Liability in New York for the Physical Consequences of Emotional Disturbance
(1932) 32 CoL. L. Rxv. 409; Hanford v. Omaha Ry. Co., 113 Neb. 423, 203 N. W. 643
(1925). 'Plaintiff, a pregnant woman, was frightened by collision of trolleys nearby and
suffered miscarriage. Recovery was allowed. This case goes to great lengths in refuting
the contentions of the court in Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N. '. 107, 45 N. E.
354 (1896) whose facts were very similar and where the court denied a recovery.
9. Freedman v. Eastern Mass., 299 Mass. 246, 12 N. E. (2d) 739 (1938) where
plaintiff, a passenger on frolley, was frightened when it collided with an automobile,
jumped from her seat and twisted her shoulder, though there was no external mark of
injury.
10. Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931). See Wilson, The New
York Rtde as to Nervous Shock (1926) 11 CORxELL L. Q. 512.
11. Bull v. Colton, 22 Barb. 94 (N. Y. 1856) where defendant hit horse drawing
plaintiff's buggy and court said he could recover for an assault upon himself.
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